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This dissertation investigates the economic impact of global accounting harmonization. 
Particularly I focus on its influence on macro level cross-border M&A investments. I posit that 
mandatory IFRS adoption lowers the systemic information noise embedded in countries' 
accounting standards. This reduces the associated information processing costs and enhances the 
economic role accounting standards play on cross-border M&A flows. After mandatory IFRS 
adoption, a 1% increase in accounting standards disparity suppresses bilateral M&A flows by 
around 2%; decrease in accounting standards disparity helps promote bilateral M&A flows when 
paired countries' governance infrastructure gap is relatively wider. I do not find these 
associations significant prior to mandatory IFRS adoption. Overall, this dissertation documents 
an evolving economic role accounting standards play on bilateral cross-border M&A flows, and 
supports International Accounting Standards Board’s advocacy in adopting a uniform set of 
accounting standards globally. Moreover, it further analyses the current adoption demand for 
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Essay I: International Financial Reporting Standards and Cross-Border 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a major component of global trade 
flows that contribute tremendously to the economic strength of the participating countries 
(Wang and Wong 2009). This paper focuses on studying how accounting standards and 
mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption influence macro 
level bilateral cross-border M&A flows. 
 
The economic scale of cross-border M&As is highly significant. According to the World 
Development Indicators Database (2008), the aggregate level of cross-border M&As 
from 1990 to 2008 accounts for around 62% of global foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows. In the latest decade (2000-2009), there were more than 270,000 deals globally with 
an aggregated value over $20 trillion (Thomas SDC database). Anecdotally, a single 
cross-border M&A transaction sometimes may even cause the domestic-to-foreign 
currency rate of the target firm's country to increase by 1% (Lehman Brothers 2000). In a 
cross-border transaction, an acquiring firm uses cross-border M&A as a major strategic 
tool for growth (Cartwright and Cooper 1993). It seeks to achieve more efficient resource 
allocation by incorporating the real assets of another firm and harvesting from the 
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potential production synergy (Davis and Skaife 2008). This capital asset reallocation 
process can help diversify acquiring firms' idiosyncratic risk (Rossi and Volpin 2004). In 
reality however, barriers such as between-country information asymmetry, institutional 
disparity and geographical disparity can greatly lower the takeover likelihood and volume 
of cross-border M&As, distorting global capital flows (Das and Sengupta 2001, Bris et al. 
2008, Rossi and Volpin 2004, Starks and Wei 2005, Martynova and Renneboog 2008, 
Davis and Skaife 2008). 
 
It is normally hard to attribute the full extent of any association observed in macro level 
economic activities (e.g. cross-border M&As) solely to accounting standards, due to 
potentially correlated institutional factors and reporting incentives (Hail et al. 2010). 
However, the recent mandating of IFRS as the basis for financial reporting provides a 
natural experiment to test the role accounting standards play on facilitating cross-border 
economic activities (Deloitte 2009). Given this setting, Marquez-Ramos (2008) 
documents the effect of IFRS adoption on FDI in EU countries. Chen et al. (2010) study 
the facilitating role of accounting standard convergence for FDI between partner 
countries. Yu (2010) explores international mutual fund portfolios and the role of 
accounting standards. In the realm of cross-border M&As, although Davis and Skaife 
(2008) provide evidence to show that non-U.S. firms engaging in IFRS are more likely to 
be targets in M&As on a transaction level, no other study directly exams the economic 
role that accounting standards play on macro level cross-border M&A flows following 
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the global accounting harmonization process1. Given the previous evidence that some 
countries adopted IFRS just to serve a labeling purpose (Daske et al., 2007a), whether the 
effect of adopting IFRS is of real economic significance to the adopting country remains 
a heatedly debated topic (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2008; Hail et al. 
2010). For that reason, I am motivated to explore the following research question in my 
study: 
 
Does mandatory IFRS adoption enhance the economic role that accounting standards 
play on bilateral production-seeking investment flows, such as cross-border M&As? 
 
The association between global accounting standards disparity and cross-border equity 
holders' investments has been documented by Yu (2010). She shows both theoretically 
and empirically that accounting standards disparity between countries is a source of 
information cost faced by foreign equity investors and influences cross-border investment 
flows. The reason is that local accounting standards may add additional systemic 
idiosyncratic noise in information signals that foreign investors employ to make 
investment decisions. Beneish and Yohn (2008) further analyze three major channels 
through which accounting standards disparity may influence the information cost. Based 
on their classification, I posit that foreign acquirers will encounter information processing 
                                                 
1 On January 1 2005, all EU countries mandatorily adopted IFRS as their major accounting standards. 
According to Yu (2010), prior to mandatory IFRS adoption, most countries announcing voluntary IFRS 
adoption had less than 5% of market capitalization in their stock exchanges. This gives statistical evidence 
to show that global accounting standards heterogeneity was unlikely to be systemically reduced prior to 
2005, given that respective countries were at different transition stages. Figure 1a shows the accounting 
harmonization process since 1976. The systemic change in global accounting standards disparity is 
hypothesized to take place following 2005 mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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friction in a cross-border M&A transaction. This is partially due to the embedded 
systematic information noise in accounting standards disparity. Consequently, foreign 
acquirers incur more information processing costs when the degree of the systemic 
information noise is higher. 
 
In line with the information noise/cost conceptual framework2, I hypothesize that the 
2005 mandatory IFRS adoption may introduce a structural change that represents the 
overall reduction in participating countries' systemic accounting information noise. 
Consequently the associated information processing costs for foreign acquirers may be 
reduced to a new level lower than a potential critical cost threshold, inducing foreign 
investors to rely more on accounting information when making investment decisions. On 
a macro level, this may change the economic role accounting standards play on bilateral 
cross-border M&A flows (Aggarwal et al. 2005; Leuz et al. 2008a). I conjecture that in 
post 2005 mandatory IFRS adoption period, foreign acquirers put more weight on 
accounting information signals sent by the target country's accounting system instead of 
alternative governance information sources. Thus a deviation from using the strategy of 
adopting IFRS will create information disadvantages to foreign acquirers and result in 
negative impact on the respective paired countries' bilateral cross-border M&A flows. 
This economically significant association may not be present prior to the 2005 mandatory 
                                                 
2 I further provide a potential rationale for why harmonizing accounting standards may reduce systemic 
idiosyncratic noise for the participating countries in Appendix A. Based on a Bertrand competition game 
model, I show that participating countries' accounting standards setters may have homogeneous incentives 
to harmonize their accounting standards by self-selecting a set of standards with the lowest level of 
systemic idiosyncratic information noise. This eventually leads to a Nash equilibrium when all participating 
countries select a common set of high quality accounting standards (such as IFRS). 
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IFRS adoption — at least for a critical period when participating countries' systemic 
accounting information noise remains at a high level that deters foreign acquirers from 
making judgments based on accounting information. 
 
I then empirically examine the degree of the economic impact accounting standards have 
on country level bilateral cross-border M&A flows for pre and post mandatory IFRS 
adoption periods3. I build my study on Marquez-Ramos (2008), Chen et al.(2010) and Yu 
(2010), and advance this literature in the following ways: (1) I measure accounting 
standards disparity change for 49 cross-border M&A participating countries before-and-
after mandatory IFRS adoption (Bae et al. 2008); (2) I examine the economic role of 
accounting standards on country-level bilateral cross-border M&A flows using a gravity 
model (Head et al. 2010); (3) I investigate the role of accounting standards interacting 
with countries' governance infrastructure gap; (4) I base my sample on a large pool 
covering over 95% of global cross-border M&A flows for 49 major countries from 2000-
2009 involving both developed and developing economies. 
 
As a result of the above mentioned approaches, I am able to more thoroughly test the 
effect of accounting standards disparity on cross-border M&A flows before-and-after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. I document that a structural change of between-country 
accounting disparity takes place due to mandatory IFRS adoption. Two new 
                                                 
3  Gordon et al. (2012) also looked at the macroeconomic impact of IFRS.  However, the focus of their 
study was on the overall impact of adopting IRFRs on the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to 
each country, with an emphasis on distinguishing between developing vs. developed countries.  Their 
findings provide strong support for the argument that developing countries have the most to gain in terms 
of FDI from adoping IFRS. 
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economically significant results appear after the mandatory IFRS adoption. First, 
accounting standards disparity in post mandatory adoption period is significantly 
negatively associated with cross-border M&A flows. My analysis shows that on average 
a 1% increase in between-country accounting standards disparity suppresses bilateral 
cross-border M&A flows by 2%. Second, lowering accounting standards disparity helps 
promote bilateral cross-border M&A flows when paired countries' governance 
infrastructure gap creates information disadvantages to foreign acquirers. Both the 
associations are present in M&A flows with over 50% post-merger ownership by the 
acquirers and are not consistently significant prior to mandatory IFRS adoption. These 
findings are robust to sub-samples excluding the United States, modified accounting 
standards disparity measure, different institutional measure and different econometric 
specification. 
 
Overall, I contribute to the literature by documenting the enhanced economic role that 
accounting standards play on bilateral cross-border M&A flows following the IFRS 
harmonization process. The findings from my study provide robust evidence to support 
the advocacy of harmonizing global accounting standards initiated by International 
Accounting Standards Board. By showing the increasing economic importance of 
accounting standards in facilitating global business, this paper sheds light on non-IFRS 
countries that plan to expand their production opportunity sets – Joining the global 
accounting community by adopting IFRS can eventually help promote their bilateral 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the institutional 
background and relevant literature, provide a conceptual framework, and develop the 
major sets of hypotheses. In Chapter 3, I describe the sample statistics and measures 
constructs. In Chapter 4, I analyze the empirically results and present the robustness tests. 
In Chapter 5, I conclude. 
Chapter 2: Background and Hypothesis Development 
Section 1: Institutional Background: Global Accounting Harmonization Timeline 
 
In 1967, Accountants International Study Group was created by the professional 
accounting bodies from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. This was the 
precursor to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) that has authority over 
developing a set of accounting standards. In 1973, the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) was formed with volunteers who met three times a year to 
discuss the accounting standards they developed, namely, International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). Later, IAS No1 to No41 were issued, however only to a limited group in 
Europe. In 2000, the IASC was restructured into the IASB, issuing International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that sit alongside or replace IAS. Starting from 
there, global accounting harmonization gained momentum. In 2002, EU countries 
announced plans to adopt IFRS in 2005. Meanwhile the IASB and the Financial 
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Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Norwalk Agreement, a significant 
landmark in the history of IFRS. 
 
In a press release of the agreement, Robert H. Herz, Chairman of FASB announced "The 
FASB is committed to working toward the goal of producing high quality reporting 
standards worldwide to support healthy global capital markets." Following the Norwalk 
Agreement, Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong committed to adopt IFRS, further 
introducing IFRS to other key financial centers of the world. The accounting setting 
authorities in all EU countries (plus non-EU countries previously announced commitment 
to adopt IFRS) mandated the use of IFRS for publicly listed firms' financial reporting 
statements beginning on January 1, 2005. Figure 1a shows the timeline of global 
accounting harmonization. 
 
[Insert Figure 1a] 
 
 
Section 2: Accounting Harmonization and Cross-Border M&As 
 
Heated debate centers on the question of whether harmonizing accounting standards 
results in good or bad economic consequences for global capital market. According to a 
capital-market based view as pointed out by Hail et al (2010), one of the major benefits 
of adopting a single set of internationally accredited accounting standards is to improve 
accounting information reliability and relevance. This results in an increase in capital 
market's liquidity and lowering the cost of equity for the adopters (Ball et al. 2000, Leuz 
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2003, Armstrong et al. 2008). However, Daske et al. (2007a) separate firms into "label" 
and "serious" adopters and discover that the "serious" adopters experience stronger 
positive effects on the cost of capital and market liquidity. 
 
Given the large body of literature examining the economic consequences of IFRS on 
capital markets, only a few papers in the accounting literature focus on the effect of IFRS 
adoption on international investments. Firms and investors weigh the benefits and costs 
when making cross-border investment decisions. For example, to lower their information 
costs, investors tend to prefer information in a familiar form (Leuz and Verrechia 2000). 
Disclosure rules providing higher quality information are favored by foreign investors 
with little access to local private information (Leuz et al. 2009). 
 
The recent harmonization wave of global accounting standards enables foreign firms to 
gain profits when the cost of acquiring financial expertise is lowered (Barth et al. 1999). 
In Europe, the accounting harmonization process reduces information cost and lowers 
information friction between countries (Ramos 2008). Consequently, international trade 
and FDI flows are significantly increased for transitional economies, which improve upon 
their local GAAP by adopting IFRS. Yu (2010) shows that home-bias in international 
mutual fund portfolios holdings is lowered because of global accounting harmonization. 
Harmonizing accounting standards increases cross-border holdings by reducing the 
information processing cost of foreign investors and indirectly reducing the effect of 
other barriers on cross-border investments such as geographic disparity. Chen et al. 
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(2010) further provide empirical results showing that the effect of reduced information 
processing cost is even stronger for paired countries whose accounting systems show 
greater pre-convergence disparity4. 
Section 3: Cross-Border M&As and Corporate Governance 
 
The cross-border M&A literature in the international finance field mainly focuses on 
corporate governance issues. Firms gain private control benefits by channeling their 
corporate assets toward best possible use abroad (Goergen and Renneboog 2008). 
Although frictions such as transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency 
conflicts can prevent efficient transfer of control, cross-border M&As are still preferred 
by firms that expect to gain major benefits by investing abroad (Rossi and Volpin 2004). 
The following are the key papers in the literature that show the mixed results of corporate 
governance effects on cross-border M&A transactions. 
 
                                                 
4 According to Graham and Spaulding (2004), cross-border M&A is part of FDI. In addition, green field 
and mutual fund portfolio investments are also components of countries' FDI (World Bank Indicators 2008). 
The reasons to study cross-border M&A investments in particular given the prior literature (Chen et al. 
2010; Marquez-Ramos 2008) are: First, the economic scale of cross-border M&A investments is highly 
significant. More than 60% of FDI in the most recent decade were cross-border M&A transactions. This 
fact suggests cross-border M&As are the most important component in countries' bilateral trade that 
deserves separate attention. Second, the degree of policy influence on the three above mentioned types of 
cross-border investments is different. In the case of green field investments, the exporting firm largely 
conforms to the target country's local policies (Wells 1992). In the case of mutual fund investments, the 
foreign investors mostly rely on the target firms' financial statements to make cash flow decisions without 
expanding production-seeking investments in the target firm (Yu 2010). Cross-border M&As are the only 
type of FDI that are heavily influenced by both countries' policies and regulations meanwhile involving real 
business operations. To examine the effect of accounting standards policy on cross-border production-
seeking investments accordingly, I tease out the other two major components of FDI and focus mainly on 
cross-border M&A investments in this study. 
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On the target firm's side, in the case of full acquisition, target firms adopt the nationality 
of acquiring firms. This enables them to adopt a better corporate governance system 
immediately (Bris and Cabolis 2008). Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that targets with 
weaker corporate governance standards are considered attractive takeover targets. In 
contrast, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) show that target firms shareholder protection 
is positively correlated with the target's cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Bris et al. 
(2008) show an insignificant relation between the target's corporate governance and its 
industry Tobin's q. 
 
On the acquiring firm's side, Kuipers et al. (2009) find that acquirers with better 
corporate governance quality tend to have positive CAR post-merger. The target firm's 
Tobin's q is also positively impacted by acquirers with better corporate governance (Bris 
et al. 2008). Contradictory evidence comes from Bris and Cabolis (2008), which argues 
that acquirers with better corporate governance suffer from negative Tobin's q after 
merging. Starks and Wei (2005) also find a significant negative relation between 
acquirers' corporate governance systems and takeover premium/CAR. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) and Bris et al. (2008) both show that the relation between acquirers' 
corporate governance quality and CAR of both acquirers and targets are insignificant. 
 
To conclude, although prior literature documents the valuation effect of corporate 
governance on cross-border M&A transactions, the economic association between 
corporate governance gap and cross-border M&A flows seems unclear given the mixed 
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results. However, firm level evidence at least suggests that foreign investors may have 
incentives to seek important value-relevant information signals about the target firm 
through its governance system ex ante making cross-border investment decisions. 
Anecdotal evidence also supports this contention. Peter Clapman, Senior Vice-president 
and Chief Counsel for Corporate Governance, TIAA-CREF once commented in 2000: "I 
think that for active investors like us, corporate governance is built into the analytic 
process of assessing deals and will figure ultimately in the decision as to whether 
premiums have to be paid for a company. I think this is a global investor issue. When 
global investors look at deals, particularly cross-border deals, they will often factor 
corporate governance issues into the equation, and these may have a practical effect on 
price and value." Based on this, I conjecture that on a macro level when the governance 
infrastructure gap between paired countries is widened, foreign investors may encounter 
information disadvantages in interpreting the value-relevant information signals 
generated by the target's country's governance system. 
Section 4: Conceptual Framework 
 
The association between accounting standards disparity and cross-border equity holders' 
investments is documented by Yu (2010). She shows theoretically and empirically that 
accounting standards disparity between countries is a source of information cost faced by 
foreign equity investors that influences cross-border investment flows. The reason is that 
local accounting standards setting authority permits policy discretion that contributes a 
level of idiosyncratic systemic noise to global accounting system as a whole. This may 
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increase the risk of wrongly interpreting the accounting information signals for foreign 
investors (Leuz 2006, PWC 2011)5. To compensate for the increased risk of wrongly 
interpreting the true information signals, foreign acquirers may incur more information 
processing costs to secure their information quality. Empirically, evidence from previous 
literature has been provided to validate this information cost hypothesis (Yu 2010, Chen 
et al. 2010). Beneish and Yohn (2008) further categorize three major channels through 
which the information cost induced by accounting disparity comes from: (1) information 
processing friction, (2) uncertainty of financial reporting quality, and (3) uncertainty 
about the distribution of future cash flows. 
 
In this paper I posit that cross-border M&A investments decisions are largely influenced 
by information costs through information processing friction (Channel 1). Information 
processing costs arise when management from acquiring firms try to familiarize 
themselves with the financial statements of the target companies, interpreting the results, 
and being able to compare the financial statements across companies for investing 
decisions. The friction in information processing is more severe when decision makers 
                                                 
5 I define systemic idiosyncratic noise mathematically to be the standard error of a random information 
signal produced by a country's accounting system. This additional risk can arise from investors having a 
murky understanding of the business in foreign countries. For example, the U.S. GAAP allows LIFO for 
inventory valuation whereas IFRS does not permit using LIFO. Being a foreign acquirer from the U.K., she 
might infer wrongly from the inventory information provided by a target firm from the U.S., even if the 
U.S. target firm does not manipulate any inventory number but simply follows the U.S. standards. To the 
U.K. acquirer, this misinterpretation is due to the lack of knowledge of the accounting standards disparity 
between the U.S. and the U.K. To overcome this disparity, the U.K. investors have to incur more 
information processing costs to understand the true information signal sent by the U.S. target firm. I regard 
this risk of wrongly interpreting any accounting information signal solely due to two countries' accounting 
standards disparity as being caused by the systemic idiosyncratic noise, embedded in two countries' 
accounting systems. Presumably, the higher degree of accounting standards disparity between two 
countries, the higher level of systemic noise foreign investors face when making investment decisions in 
the other country. More specifications of systemic standards disparity are detailed in Horton et al. (2007). 
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compile financial statements using different accounting standards (Gehrig 1993). To 
avoid information processing friction, investors from EU countries tend to increase their 
ownership in companies that adopt international accounting standards (Covrig et al. 
2007). This shows that IFRS is a set of accounting standards preferred by investors when 
information processing costs become a concern to foreign investors. 
 
To guide my hypothesis development, I supplement previous analysis with a stylized 
analytical model based on game theory that provides a potential rationale why 
harmonizing accounting standards can give rise to a lowered level of accounting 
standards systemic noise. The model in Appendix A incorporates Yu (2010)'s analytical 
model's assumptions and the information cost hypothesis developed by Beneish and 
Yohn (2008). 
 
One of the motivations for countries to adopt IFRS is to attract foreign capital flows by 
reducing information barriers (IASB 2010)6. Based on a Bertrand competition model, I 
show that in order to compete to be the most informationally attractive to foreign 
acquirers, the target countries' accounting standards bodies have homogeneous incentives 
to self-select a set of accounting standards that have the lowest degree of systemic 
idiosyncratic noise 7 . At the Nash equilibrium, all target countries select the lowest 
                                                 
6 Detailed mathematical derivation and analysis are provided in Appendix A. 
7 This is consistent with the objective of financial reporting outlined in IASB's Conceptual Framework of 
Financial Reporting: "The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other 
creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. General purpose financial reports 
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possible systemic noise in their standards, equivalently, harmonizing the accounting 
standards 8 . Intuitively, this analytical result indicates that harmonizing accounting 
standards by adopting IFRS, assuming it provides a good proxy for the set of standards 
that generate the lowest possible systemic noise, is the best strategy for all participating 
countries. Moreover, at harmonized accounting regime (i.e., after mandatory IFRS 
adoption for major countries), any deviation from the Nash strategy of adopting common 
accounting standards is sub-optimal to the respective country and discourages between-
country investment flows. This predicts a negative economic association between 
accounting standards disparity and cross-border M&A flows post mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
Section 5: Hypothesis Development 
 
In reality, accounting harmonization process is not a once-and-for-all event. Therefore 
the economic role accounting standards plays on cross-border M&A flows following the 
harmonization process may evolve in line with the harmonization process, instead of a 
dramatic change at the beginning stage. Given the timeline of mandatory IFRS adoption, 
the harmonization process mainly spans from 2000-2005 pre mandatory IFRS adoption 
                                                                                                                                                 
are not designed to show the value of a reporting entity; but they provide information to help estimate the 
value of the reporting entity." 
8 Ramanna and Sletten (2011) test the hypothesis that perceived network benefits explain part of countries' 
quick shift to adopt IFRS between 2003 and 2008 and argue that the benefits come from lowered 
transaction cost for foreign investors. This partially validates the information processing cost hypothesis of 
this paper. The fact that network benefits exist post 2005 IFRS adoption strengthens the idea that foreign 
investors face less information processing cost during that period due to externality. I provide a further 
analysis based on game theory to show the potential systemic noise driver of such cost and how countries' 
accounting standards setters react to competition by self-selecting an optimal level of the noise driver. This 
analytical framework reconciles both pre and post IFRS period evidence shown in this paper. 
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regime to post 2005 mandatory IFRS adoption accounting regime. I conjecture that prior 
to 2005, the aggregated systemic information noise of all participating countries is at a 
critical mass that foreign acquirers may rely less on the accounting system of the target 
country in the process of decision-making9. Consequently, accounting disparity may not 
economically influence cross-border M&A flows on a large scale. However after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption 10 , I suspect that the participating countries' systemic 
information noise is greatly reduced due to mandatory IFRS adoption. This may translate 
into a level of average information processing cost faced by foreign acquirers lower than 
a potential critical cost threshold, enabling accounting system to be one major cost 
effective information source foreign acquirers rely on to make cross-border M&A 
investment decisions11. Consequently, at the regime with more and have a significant 
negative economic impact on the country's ability to attract cross-border M&A flows. 
Based on this contention, I arrive at the following set of hypotheses in their null form: 
 
                                                 
9 One explanation for the high degree of systemic information noise is due to the fact that each country was 
at different IFRS convergence stage prior to 2005. Between 2000 and 2004, countries concurrently use 
accounting standards such as local GAAP, IFRS on a voluntary basis, and modified local GAAP 
converging with IFRS. This temporarily creates a critical noise mass that may largely deter foreign 
acquirers' reliance on the information signals produced by target country's accounting system (Delloitte 
2011). 
10 Horton et al. (2011) examine effects of IFRS on analyst forecasts accuracy, following disagreements and 
volatility for revisions. They document a learning curve during IFRS adoption and show that during the 
mandatory transition period to IFRS in 2005 to 2007, those firms that are voluntarily adopting IFRS have 
the largest improvement in the transition period. This finding supports the existence of a structural change 
in accounting standards' role, as proposed in this paper. 
11 Horton and Serafeim (2007) also study the systemic components embedded in IFRS and local UK 
GAAP. They provide evidence from the U.K. to show that IFRS reveals timely value relevant information 
and the accounting information provided by IFRS change investors' beliefs about stock price and 
consequently generates trading activity. This evidence supports the author's view regarding the potential 
shift in foreign acquirers' view towards the decision usefulness of accounting information in post 
mandatory IFRS adoption period, due to systemic change in accounting standards disparity. 
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H01a: Accounting standards disparity, on average, does not influence bilateral cross-
border M&A flows pre mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
H01b: Accounting standards disparity, on average, does not influence bilateral cross-
border M&A flows post mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Further, as noted earlier in the literature review section, I conjecture that with wider 
between-country governance infrastructure gap, foreign acquirers may encounter higher 
information processing costs driven by the governance systems' gap, provided that they 
rely mostly on governance information in decision making prior to 2005. When foreign 
acquirers find it costly to correct for the governance information signals errors, the 
accounting system of the target country with much lower information processing cost 
seems to be a satisfactory alternative information source, which can also provide decision 
useful information. Similar to hypothesis 1, I suspect that this compensation role is also 
enhanced following accounting harmonization process. To investigate this effect, I 
suggest the following set of hypotheses in their null form: 
 
H02a: Accounting standards disparity, on average, does not influence bilateral cross-
border M&A flows when paired countries have higher corporate governance gap pre 




H02b: Accounting standards disparity, on average, does not influence bilateral cross-
border M&A flows when paired countries have higher corporate governance gap post 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Section 1: Empirical Specification 
 
A large body of economics research on international trade employs a gravity model— so 
named since the model is similar in form and analogous in interpretation to the 
mathematical model Sir Isaac Newton proposed in the seventeenth century to 
characterize universal gravitation. It describes certain behavior in social sciences that 
induce the "gravitational" effects, which can be attributed to certain elements containing 
mass and distance. Papers in international economics using various econometric 
specifications of the gravity model include Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand 
(1985), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Hummels 2001, Evenett and Keller (2002), 
Redding and Venables (2004). These papers address such issues as bilateral trading 
pattern, increasing returns to scale, imperfectly competitive markets and firm-level 
product differentiation. In the estimation of models of geography and trade, the gravity 
model is again widely used, though the econometric specifications tend to vary catering 




The empirical work I report in this study is also based on a gravity model. Following 
Head et al. (2010), I adopt a simple theoretical expression of the gravity model here: 
 
                                                   ex imijt t it jt ijtY G M M φ=                                                     (1) 
 
 
In equation (1), ijtY  represents the international trade flow from exporting country i  to 
importing country j  at time t ; tG  represents a year-specific component that amplifies  
 
the volume of trade; exitM  and 
im
jtM  represent indexes of the attributes of exporter i  and  
 
 importer j in a specific year t ; ijtφ  represents variations in bilateral trade intensity, a  
 
combination of variables that influence the trade cost between two countries. I follow  
 
approach of Head et al. (2010) by taking log on both sides of equation (1) and model by a 
 





                                   ln ln ln lnex imijt t it jt ijt ijtY G M M Dδ ε= + + + +                                 (2) 
 
 where ln ijt ijt ijtDφ δ µ= +                                              (3)  
 
 
In equation (2), I denote exitM  and 
im
jtM  as monadic control variables varying across  
 
countries and years. I denote ijtD  as dyadic variables, which are country or year dummy  
 
variables. ijtµ is the error term in equation (3). The potential effect of information cost 
 
 induced by accounting standards disparity enters into equation (3) as one of the trading 
 
 cost components. The rest of variable set are control variables. The major benefits of  
 




concerns of inflated significance caused by cross-sectional correlation in the error terms 
 
 within an adopting country. Second, the gravity model has been empirically tested to 
 
 possess high explanatory power in various bilateral flow setting. 
 
 
Section 2: Cross-Border M&A Deal Source 
 
My sample contains all cross-border M&A deals completed between January 1, 2000 and 
December 31, 2009, reported by SDC Platinum. This is a database from Thomson 
Financial that reports both public and private firms' transactions. The SDC Platinum 
database is one of the major sources for studying global M&A transactions, although 
some small countries report deals less frequently (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Bris et al. 
2008, etc)12. Table 2 Panel A shows the detailed sample descriptive statistics of cross-
border M&A activities for 49 major countries from 2000 to 2009. In total, there are more 
than 275,000 deals worth more than 22 trillion in current dollars from the bilateral M&A 
transactions. 
Section 3: Sample Selection 
 
Since mandatory IFRS adoption officially started from January 1 2005, this total sample 
from 2000 to 2009 was selected with 2005 as cutoff year to balance pre and post periods, 
i.e., five years pre mandatory adoption and five years post mandatory adoption. This is to 
                                                 
12 I checked the volume numbers reported by SDC with World Bank Development Indicators database and 
found no significant deviations in reporting figures. I also checked the total aggregate value with prior 
literature and found no significant deviations (Tanakon 2010). 
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enable comparisons of accounting disparity at the two accounting regimes based on 
relatively equal sample size. The reason for this sub-division of the sample is that 2005 is 
the cutoff year that mandatory adoption of IFRS took place and introduced an exogenous 
shock to all publicly listed firms in participating countries. 
 
I then selected 49 countries worldwide, out of which 17 countries have not adopted IFRS. 
The rationale for selecting these countries is to follow the Bae et al. (2008) survey study, 
which covers the 49 countries with sufficient data for each country's information 
regarding its accounting standards and their matching with IFRS requirements. The 
accounting local GAAP measure developed by Bae et al. (2008) captures 21 dimensions 
of a country's local accounting standards, including taxation, business consolidation, 
goodwill etc. The measurement is most recent and rather inclusive that it mitigates the 
concerns of the accounting disparity measure not capturing specific accounting 
components that influence cross-border M&A transactions separately in reality. Although 
the sample does not cover 208 countries worldwide, the aggregate volume of cross-
border M&A for the 49 countries included accounts for more than 95% of global M&A 
volume from 2000 to 2009. 
 
After extracting all deals' information from SDC database, I summed up transaction 
volumes of yearly deals of a specific country pair to form cross-border country level flow 
data, based on M&A flow types. I distinguished M&A flow types based on the degree of 
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influence the acquiring firm has over the target firm and the respective different 
accounting treatments. 
 
In cross-border M&A transactions, the acquirer's post-merger ownership with more than 
50% shares (denoted as Type I M&A) is treated by IFRS standards as business 
combinations and the degree of influence by the acquirer is to take significant control of 
the target firm. In the case of post-merger ownership less or equal to 50% (denoted as 
Type II M&A), the deal is either investment in financial assets (the acquirer's ownership 
is less than 20%) or investments in associates (the acquirer's ownership is between 20% 
to 50%). The latter type of M&A requires "pooling of interests" or "equity method" 
accounting treatment, depending on different accounting standards a country selects to 
implement. This approach gives 6,562 country-pair/year observations from 2000 to 2009 
in total13. In Type I case acquirers are assumed to have much influence in the target firm's 
policy choice by incorporating the target firm's accounting system into the acquirer's 
(Martynova and Renneboog 2008). In Type II cases, acquirers and targets have discretion 
to choose an optimal set of accounting standards not necessarily adopted by either side 
during M&A negotiating process. The latter renegotiation process may provide flexibility 
in accounting policy setting for the merged firm and mitigate any negative impact caused 
by accounting standards change, should there be any. The difference in degree of 
                                                 
13 Ideally, the data should contain 49X48 country-pair observations from 2000 to 2009, while the actually 
sample used in the study shrinks to 6594. Three reasons may explain this data shrink: first, some smaller 
countries did not report to SDC regarding cross-border M&A private deals due to lack of merging laws. 
Second, some countries did not have actual cross-border M&A transactions for some years. Last, SDC 
coverage of countries changes throughout years; during earlier years the data were less sufficient than the 
most recent years. Flows with opposite directions between two countries were treated as two separate 
observations. I corrected standard errors for extreme outliers. 
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freedom in merging two firms' accounting systems implies that accounting standards 
systemic change will impact Type I flows more severely than Type II flows. Table 2 
Panel B shows the yearly distribution of the sample. From 2000 to 2009, the number of 
transactions qualified for this study ranges from 538 to 812 each year. In aggregate, Type 
I M&A flows account for around 64% of all cross-border flows. 
Next I selected a sub-sample excluding the United States from my total sample to 
eliminate the idiosyncratic error introduced by this particular country. Data indicate that 
during this near decade, more than 43% capital flows of all 49 countries involved the 
United States. Given the fact that U.S. GAAP and IFRS still differ in their treatments of 
business combinations and overall accounting standards, I investigated a sub-sample 
without the U.S. to make sure that any result from the total sample is valid apart from the 
idiosyncratic error introduced by the U.S. Also, this sub-sample selection procedure 
allows for cross-sectional comparison between the EU dominated M&A flows and the 
overall global flows that involve the U.S. impact. 
Section 4: Measures: Test Variables 
Table 2 gives the definitions and measurements for all the test variables and control 
variables. The dependent variable is log of the total volume of bilateral cross-border 
M&A aggregated flows between two countries for all the hypotheses. 
 





To test the first set of hypotheses, I constructed two measures of accounting disparity for 
both pre and post mandatory IFRS adoption periods of each country pair. Based on Bae et 
al. (2008), I constructed AD1 by coding it 1 if two paired countries do not consistently 
follow a specific accounting rule according to IFRS; 0 if both countries follow a specific 
IFRS principle or neither follows it. I then took the average score of the sum of all 21 
IFRS rules. This approach gives the first measure of accounting disparity for testing 
purpose in terms of percentage. Given the fact that "neither country follows a rule" may 
not indicate the disparity of their accounting standards in the respective dimension, I thus 
constructed modified measure AD2 based on AD1 by further coding the respective 
dimension 1 if these two countries have different legal origins and 0 if not; then take the 
average (Yu 2010, Bae et al. 2008). For the post-adoption period, I manually corrected 
the coding according to a country's adoption status and then recalculated the two 
accounting disparity measures. This approach allows me to construct four accounting 
standards disparity measures 1(2)PREDIFF  and 1(2)POSTDIFF  for pre and post periods 
respectively. 
 
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, I first constructed two measures of country-level corporate 
governance. I used the first principal component of six country-level governance 
indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009) as one corporate governance (CG) 
measure. The six indicators are voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effects, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption; none of which involve a 
country's accounting standards quality aspect directly. Each indicator ranges from -2.5 to 
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2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. By taking the first 
principal component of the six indicators, I obtained a governance measure that accounts 
for around 90% of the data variation, while reducing the six dimensions to one dimension 
only (Jolliffe 1986). I then took the absolute value of two paired countries' CG measure 
difference to form 1GOVDIFF . 
 
The second measure I used is the self-dealing-index developed by Djankov et al. (2008), 
with higher value representing higher degree of minority investor protection. This index 
captures the degree of a country's investor protection against foreign controllers. To be 
consistent with 1GOVDIFF  that captures a country's investment environment attraction to 
foreign investors, I then multiplied the anti-self-dealing-index by -1 and calculated the 
absolute value of two paired countries measure disparity to form 2GOVDIFF . 
 
Last, I created dummy variables representing upper 25% and lower 25% based on these 
two CG measures and interacted them with AD measures to construct 1(2)HPREDIFF , 
1(2)LPREDIFF , 1(2)HPOSTDIFF , and 1(2)LPOSTDIFF for pre and post periods 
respectively. 
Section 5: Control Variables 
 
I used a CEPII dataset for all the control variables in my regressions, which makes 
available a "square" gravity dataset for all world pairs of countries for the period 1948 to 
2006. I self-developed the dataset to cover year 2007 to 2009 for all included countries. 
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In a variety of gravity models, the monadic effects were controlled by taking log of both 
countries' GDP per capita and population, as determinants of bilateral trade patterns. I 
included them in all my regressions as control variables. Also, for dyadic control 
variables, I controlled for time-fixed dyadic variables by including log of weighted-
disparity and dummies coded 1 if both countries have common contiguity; common 
official language; common ethnos; common colonizer post 1945; common legal origin; 
are pairs in colonial relationship post 1945; ever have been in colonial relationship; are 
currently in colonial relationship. For time-varying dyadic control variables, I included 
dummies coded 1 if both countries are GATT/WTO members; have regional trade 
agreement in force; common currency; are from ACP countries to EU countries; are from 
EU countries to ACP countries. The detailed sources and definitions of each control 
variable are included in Table 2. These control variables are widely used in bilateral trade 
literature (Head et al. 2010; Ramos 2008) to control for the "gravitational" effects in the 
gravity model. Table 3 describes the sample summary statistics. 
 









Chapter 4: Results 
Section 1: Univariate Analysis 
 
Figure 2a plots the accounting disparity change pre and post IFRS mandatory adoption 
for 49 countries. The accounting disparity measure and the modified measure both 
indicate that IFRS mandatory adoption induces a reduction in the accounting disparity 
between all country pairs. According to measure I, on average about 8% of accounting 
standards disparity is reduced after mandatory IFRS adoption for all the 49 major 
countries; this figure increases to 33% by the modified measure, which can be regarded 
as a higher bound. Figure 2b and 2c plot the accounting standards disparity change based 
on paired countries' adoption status. The results indicate that accounting standards 
disparity drops more rapidly in absolute value for country pairs that both mandatorily 
adopt IFRS, around 40% to 44% reduction. However, for country pairs that only one 
adopts IFRS, the change is less significant, ranging from +14% to -5%. 
 
[Insert Figure 2a] 
 
Table 4 Panel A shows the summary results for univariate analysis of accounting 
standards disparity decrease based on country pairs' adoption status 14 . Among all 
                                                 
14 Statistics shown on Table 3 Panel A and Figure 2a-2c show a minor difference. The reason is that in 
Table 3 Panel A, country pairs receive different weighting subject to M&A flow availability and frequency 
in respective years. In Figure 2a-2c, the weighting is equally loaded on each country pair regardless of 
M&A flows and years. 
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included observations in the sample, country pairs with both adopting IFRS show the 
highest drop in accounting disparity after mandatory adoption, ranging from 41% to 62% 
based on two AD measures. Changes of accounting disparity for country pairs with one 
adopting IFRS and one not adopting are not as significant as the both-adoption case, 
ranging from -17% to 11% based on two AD measures. For country pairs with neither 
adopting IFRS, the accounting disparity does not change. Overall, for all observations 
included in the sample, mandatory IFRS adoption decreases between-country accounting 
disparity ranging from 5% to 16%. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
 
Panel B1 and B2 describes the accounting disparity decrease based on country pairs' 
adoption status under high/low governance gap. The results are largely consistent with 
Panel A. 
 
Table 5 shows the Pearson Spearman correlation matrix for all the test variables and 
control variables. Almost all test variables do not correlate with each other with higher 
than 0.4 correlation coefficients. Coefficients in bold are within 5% level of significance. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
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Section 2: Regression Analysis 
 
Table 6 shows the results of IFRS mandatory adoption on pair-wise M&A flows. I 
empirically test the following equation: 
ln ijt ijt it jt ijt ijtVALUE X MonadicVars MonadicVars DyadicVars µ= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (4) 





Based on the results summarized in Table 6 Panel A, I do not reject H1a but reject H1b. 
Overall, accounting standards disparity is negatively associated with cross-border M&A 
flows after mandatory IFRS adoption. This association is not significant in pre adoption 
period, indicated by Columns (1) (2) and (5) (6). Columns (3) (4) and (7) (8) show that in 
post mandatory IFRS adoption regime, on average, 1% increase in accounting standards 
disparity suppresses 1% to 2% in cross-border M&A flows based on two AD measures, 
after controlling for various country characteristics, clustering by year and correcting for 
heterogeneity in the error term. This is economically significant, considering cross-border 
M&As' total value. A further look into the result shows that this association is mostly 
driven by Type I M&A flows, which represents flows with major ownership transfer 
from target countries to acquiring countries. Also, the results are robust to sub-samples 
that exclude the U.S. flows. Panel B Chow test statistics suggest a structural change in the 
AD coefficients across two accounting regimes. Overall, the results document an 
enhanced economic role that accounting standards play on cross-border M&A flows. In 
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the post mandatory IFRS adoption accounting regime, deviating from the commonly used 
IFRS standards will result in significant reduction in respective country's cross-border 
M&A flows. This conclusion generally does not apply at less pre mandatory IFRS 
adoption accounting regime prior to 2005. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
 
Table 7 further investigates the role of accounting harmonization in complementing the 
country-level corporate governance (CG) gap. I use the following equation to test the 
hypotheses: 
 
ln ijt ijt ijt it jt ijt ijtVALUE HAD LAD MonadicVars MonadicVars DyadicVars µ= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (5) 
 
1(2) 1(2)ijtHAD HPREDIFF orHPOSTDIFF= for pre and post adoption periods respectively; 
1(2) 1(2)ijtLAD LPREDIFF orLPOSTDIFF= for pre and post adoption periods respectively; 
 
 
Based on the results summarized in Table 7 Panel A, I do not reject H2a but reject H2b. 
During pre mandatory IFRS adoption period, according to Columns (1) (2) and (5) (6), I 
do not observe a consistent association between accounting disparity under high CG gap 
and the bilateral flows, based on different AD measures. However, during post 
mandatory IFRS adoption period, if the two countries have relatively high CG gap (upper 
25%), 1% decrease of accounting disparity can promote 1.6% M&A flows on average, as 
indicated by the combined sample results in columns (3) (4) and (7) (8). This result also 
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holds for samples excluding the U.S., though the coefficients are smaller. I do not 
observe a generally significant association between accounting standards disparity and 
cross-border M&A flows with low CG gap. This shows that although under both cases 
the accounting standards disparity changes following the similar pattern after mandatory 
IFRS adoption, the complementary effect of accounting standards is more significant to 
those country pairs that have relatively higher CG gap. This is intuitively valid because 
acquiring firms generally incur more information processing costs by relying on the 
signals produced by a rather different governance system of the target firm's country. 
Chow test statistics support this structural change. Results for Type II M&A flows are 
generally insignificant. 
 
To sum, Table 7 implies that after mandatory IFRS adoption, when two firms are from 
countries with relatively higher institutional difference, reducing accounting standards 
disparity may help promote cross-border M&A flows. 
 
 







Chapter 5:  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
In this section, I present a set of robustness tests with discussions to validate the 
proceeding results. I address concerns subject to the robustness of the results, 
econometric specification, governance measurement errors, and endogeneity issues. 
Section 1: Robustness of the Findings in Post Mandatory IFRS Adoption Period 
 
To further validate the significant findings in post-IFRS period, I adopted a change model 
as an alternative econometric methodology in the following form: 
 
ijt ijt it jt ijt ijtVALUE AD MonadicVars MonadicVars DyadicVars µ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + +∑ ∑ ∑      (6) 
 
 
I selected a sub-sample of country/year observations in 2005 and 2007, with the 
screening requirement that a country-pair shall have bilateral M&A flows in both years. I 
separately tested the effect of accounting standards disparity on Type I and Type II M&A 
flows. The rationale for this testing strategy is: Given mandatory IFRS adoption took 
place on January 1st 2005, the structural change in accounting disparity will highly likely 
occur within 2 years. This time lag takes account of any country that announced adoption 





From Table 8, the results are largely consistent with prior analysis: for Type I case, 1% 
change of accounting standards disparity results in about 2% change in cross-border 
M&A flows. This effect does not appear significant for Type II M&A flows. 
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
Section 2: Alternative Governance Measure 
 
I presented a robustness test by replacing the PCA corporate governance measure with 
the one developed by Djankov et al (2008). This is a measure capturing the legal 
protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders. The 
results are shown in Table 10. On average, 1% change of accounting standards disparity 
impacts around 1% to 1.5% on cross-border Type I M&A flows, given relatively wider 
corporate governance gap. Chow test statistics support that there is a structural change 
induced the mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
Session 3: Endogeneity Concerns 
 
The industrial organization literature suggests that a large increase in two countries' 
cross-border trade may help promote ideas and knowledge, and help the move towards 
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uniform standards (Branstetter 1998). To address the endogeneity concern that there 
exists potential reverse causality between cross-border M&A flows and accounting 
standards harmonization, I checked the macro trend of cross-border M&A flows between 
2000 and 2009, based on country pairs' adoption type.  
 
The descriptive results are shown in Figure 1c. In 2002, when EU announces plans to 
adopt IFRS in 2005, global bilateral cross-border M&A flows were decreasing to the 
trough of the most recent decade. In 2005, when mandatory IFRS took place in EU 
countries, cross-border M&A flows were increasing at a rapid speed, but not yet reached 
the peak. This evidence suggests that it is unlikely for the reverse causality between 
cross-border flows and accounting standards disparity to hold, for two main reasons: 
First, the decrease of aggregate flows is unlikely to promote further ideas' spreading 
among countries concerning the idea of moving towards a uniformed set of accounting 
standards; second, the 2005 mandatory IFRS change took place during a time when 
bilateral flows were neither at the trough nor at the peak. The lack of an apparent kink in 
2005 at least suggests that the mandatory adoption event was unlikely to be driven by any 
shock in cross-border M&A flows then. 
 
[Insert Figure 1c] 
 
The contention that IFRS adoption drives information environment change is consistent 
with Horton et al. (2008), which also address the causality concern by adopting a two-
stage instrumental variable (IV) model. To further supplement this study, I checked the 
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major results using IV methodology. I adopt both partner countries’ population difference 
as instruments for their accounting standards disparity. Overall speaking, the results are 
largely consistent with prior analysis in terms of signs and magnitudes, although weakly 
significant by AD measure II. Further study may carry forward to find a more reliable 
instrument, or use more advanced methodology to attack the macro level endogeneity 
issue. 
 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
This paper provides macro level evidence documenting the enhanced economic role of 
accounting standards on bilateral cross-border mergers and acquisition flows. I posit that 
mandatory IFRS adoption significantly lowers the systemic information noise embedded 
in participating countries' accounting standards. Consequently the associated information 
processing costs for foreign acquirers are reduced to a level lower than a potential critical 
threshold, enhancing the economic role accounting standards play on international 
investment flows. In post mandatory IFRS adoption period, accounting standards 
disparity appears to be one significant factor that influences cross-border M&A bilateral 
flows. On average, a 1% deviation from the commonly used accounting standards (IFRS) 
suppresses bilateral cross-border M&A flows by 2% post mandatory IFRS adoption. This 
economic association does not generally appear in pre mandatory IFRS adoption period. 
36 
 
Given the fact that aggregated bilateral flows are valued at more than 20 trillion dollars in 
the most recent decade, the economic consequence of mandatory IFRS adoption is clearly 
important. Further, when paired countries have a wider governance gap that may create 
information disadvantages to foreign acquirers, so reducing the accounting standards 
disparity has a positive impact on their bilateral cross-border M&A flows after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption. This robust finding indicates that accounting standards may 
serve a complementary role to a country's governance infrastructure in facilitating 
bilateral cross-border trade. 
 
This paper gives evidence on an aggregated level to support the advocacy of global 
accounting harmonization initiated by IASB. It shows the increasing economic and policy 
importance of adopting a set of internationally uniform accounting standards. For 
countries that are considering expanding their growth opportunity sets, particular those in 
the developing economies, the results of the study suggest that adopting IFRS or at least 
converging to IFRS can help promote their bilateral cross-border M&A trade flows. 
These results should be interpreted with caution though, due to common shortcomings of 
a country-level study. Further studies should continue to explore the effect of accounting 








Essay II: Who Cares about IFRS in the United States? 
Section 1: IFRS Lobbying in the United States 
 
The United States, in an effort to join the global accounting harmonization wave, actively 
played a leadership in developing mutually acceptable international accounting standards 
since 1988. As shown in Figure 1b, starting from 1997, SEC fully recognized the efforts 
made by International Accounting Standards Committee (IASB) in developing 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), the predecessor of what now becomes IFRS. 
In 2000, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), an 
organization in which U.S. SEC participated as a leader, recommended to its members to 
use 30 core standards issued by IASB’s predecessor in cases of cross-border listing and 
international IPO. Later in 2002, Norwalk Agreement between the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and IASB was announced by SEC. These agreements started 
many mutual convergence projects and eventually lead to SEC’s acceptance from foreign 
private issuers’ financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS without 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP in 2007. The key document discussing the possibility of 
adopting IFRS in 2014 in the U.S. was announced in 2008 and two years later, in 2010, 
SEC issued a statement in support of convergence and global accounting standards and 
calls for the development and execution of a work plan. 
 
 




Section 2: SEC Comment Letters and Lobbying Activity  
 
“This Roadmap sets forth several milestones that, if achieved, could lead to the required use of 
IFRS by U.S. issuers in 2014 if the Commission believes it to be in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors.”                                                                                                                                   
---SEC, 2008 
 
The United States Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a history for inviting 
the public to express their opinions freely to any new regulation under discussion. On 
November 14th 2008, it issued Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements 
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers. 
This Roadmap, once supported by public firms and legislation bodies, would “eventually 
lead to the passage of IFRS in the United States” (SEC, 2008). Although globally there 
have been more than a hundred countries adopting IFRS either officially or on a 
voluntary basis (Delloitte 2009), in the United States, this issue has been heatedly 
discussed. Two contradicting views prevail in the literature. On one hand, from a capital-
market-based view, previous researches have emphasized the positive side of IFRS in 
improving financial reporting transparency and as a result reduce the cost of capital for 
adopting firms (Daske, H. 2005); on the other hand, incentive-based view argues that due 
to country legislative differences, firms’ reporting incentives, and inconsistent 
interpretation and applications of IFRS, the new accounting standard itself does not 
change the underlying accounting misreporting incentives materially; hence there shall 
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not be significant material benefit to firms by mere standards change (Covrig et al. 2007; 
Hail et al. 2009).  
 
Managers or corporations may wish to retain their power over their choice of accounting 
practice, for the purpose of concealing unpleasant financial information or managing 
earnings to meet certain growth benchmark (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). In order to do 
so they have the incentives to lobby to accounting standards setting authority and express 
their concerns, not merely in the full view of the interesting public but for their own 
private concerns. The most frequently used approach, as agreed by both the private 
parties and the standard setting body such as SEC, is by means of comment letters, with 
specifies major accounting policy change inquiries in each publicly available document. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Deakin (1989) and Dechow et al (1996) use empirical 
methodology and take comment letters sent to the standard setter as the basis of their 
analysis in the United States. MacArthur (1988) and Georgiou (2002) focus on the 
lobbying activities in the United Kingdom. While it may raise some doubt over the 
different means of lobbying to SEC, in addition to the comment letter approach, 
Georgiou (2004) finds that the latter approach is a good proxy for a company’s overall 
lobbying posture, which gives more justification for this paper to focus on studying the 
comment letters as a main political lobbying mechanism.  
 
While most of the IFRS empirical evidence comes from European context, little 
empirical evidence has been provided from the United States, partially due to data 
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unavailability. To address some preliminary questions before IFRS being officially 
introduced into the United States, three major questions are asked in this section:  
 
I, who are the potential U.S. firms that will be impacted materially by IFRS and as a 
result corresponded actively to SEC Roadmap?  
 
II, among the key self-defined dimensions of IFRS discussion, which dimensions are 
being heatedly debated? 
 
III, for each heatedly debated dimension, do firms with different reporting incentives 
react to IFRS differentially? If so, is IFRS favored more by firms with relatively better 
reporting incentives or the reverse? 
 
Section 3: Data Processing of Comment Letters 
 
I manually collected all 251 comment letters from SEC website and coded six dimensions 
of firms’ opinions. By sorting the diverging opinions into six dimensions, I find that 
opinion diverges in three major dimensions, namely IFRS comparability, IFRS quality 
and market economic and litigation consequences. My results show that firms with longer 
age, more segments, more analysts covering, larger size and poorer profitability tend to 
be more eager to lobby to SEC regarding their opposing or supporting IFRS adoption 
opinions; industry-wise, statistics show that retail, utility and banking industries will be 
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more concerned about IFRS adoption in the United States; moreover, this behavior 
pattern cannot be explained by firms’ idiosyncratic tastes in reacting to SEC comment 
letters request. Among all firms with adequate data, I find that U.S. firms with relatively 
less shareholder protections and therefore more misreporting incentives, as captured by 
G-Index, incline to express opposing opinions regarding the previous three heatedly 
debated dimensions.  
 
To help understand the current IFRS converging status of the United States, I read each 
comment letter published on SEC website and identified six key dimensions that are of 
key interests, denoted as “Comparability”, “Quality”, “Effect”, “Scheme”, “FASB” and 
“Cost”. In terms of “Comparability”, I read the content of the comment letter and coded 1 
if that particular commenter expressed words containing “comparable”, “comparability” 
with a supporting point of view of IFRS’ improvements on financial reporting 
comparability, using rational logical deduction; coded 0 if the view is opposing and 3 
otherwise. In terms of “Quality”, the letters were read and coded 1 if the word “quality” 
was mentioned in the letter, with a clear expressions of supporting that IFRS is a high 
quality accounting standard, such as “agree it is of high quality” or “support the high 
quality standards” etc; it was coded 0, if the opinion was opposing and 3 otherwise. For 
“Effect”, the content covered the lines in the comment letters, which explicitly discussed 
the potential capital market economic benefits/costs, auditor responsibility and litigation 
risk, other than implementation cost that IFRS might bring to the commenter, for 
example, Ebay Inc. expressed its opinion “…but will also enable investors to evaluate us 
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more effectively…”. Similar favorable opinions covering this range were coded 1; any 
opposing opinion was coded 0 and 3 otherwise. For “Scheme”, it stands for the adoption 
proposal raised by SEC Roadmap. An opinion was coded 1 if the commenter responded 
in favor of the current adoption plan; if the commenter was against the plan, it was coded 
0; it was coded 3 otherwise. For “FASB”, an opinion was coded 1 if the commenter 
supported the coordination between FASB and IASB, for example “We support the 
current convergence projects…”; the letter was coded 0, if the commenter expressed 
unfavorable opinion towards FASB and IASB convergence projects, such as “… lose the 
authority over supervising accounting standards…”; 3 if no opinion expressed or other. 
“Cost” was coded 1 if a firm explicitly expressed opinions pointing to the fact that the 
benefit of implementing IFRS overweighs the cost; coded 0 if a firm believed that the 
cost of implementation is higher than the benefit; 3 otherwise. A second reader randomly 
double checked the coding for controlling the sampling error. Appendix I provides a 
detailed description of the collected data.  
 
In addition, all comment letters were separated into eight categories, namely, public 
firms, non-public firms, non-investor group, investor group, individuals, accountants, 
academia and other. Public firms represent the group of publicly trading firms; non-
public firms represent the group of private firms; investor group represents business 
association, industry organization and investment association; non-investor group 
represent any group that is not of a business orientation; individuals represent any 
working professionals; accountants represent accounting firms and its staff; academia 
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represents accounting professors from universities; other represents any government 
organization that does not fall into the previous seven categories. After deleting 60 non-
opinion letters, 10 non-public firm letters, 24 non-investor group letters, 8 investor group 
letters, 9 individual letters, 18 accountants letters, 14 academia letters and 20 other 
letters, I reached a sample of 88 public firms. Essay II Table 1 describes the sample 
selection process. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Section 4: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2A provides the summary statistics of public opinion divergence regarding SEC 
Roadmap. In column 1, 70% commenters expressed opposing opinions to SEC Roadmap 
proposal of cost of implementing IFRS, whereas only14% supported. Public firms went 
even further—81% opposed the SEC estimation of implementation cost. In a comment 
letter, it is even stated that “…the estimated cost could even exceed the cost of 
implementing SOX…” In column 2, comparability issue casts a debate among 
commenters. 37% in total agreed that IFRS, once adopted in the United States, will 
improve the comparability of financial reporting, whereas 47% believed that the 
comparability improvements will not take effect in the U.S. setting. Similar contradicting 
debates are also found in FASB and Effects dimensions. More than 60% public firms 
believed that FASB will not be dominated by IASB and as a result loses degree of 
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freedom, while 20% oppose this argument. The most diverging views come from the 
Effects dimension, where the pros and cons are almost head-to-head—48% objecting and 
50% supporting. In summary, public firms held more diverging opinions than the general 
public. The three heated debated dimensions with less than 40% difference between pros 
and cons are Comparability, Quality, and Effects. 
 
 
[Insert Table 2A] 
 
In terms of industry distribution, Table 2B provides the detailed descriptive statistics. 
Using 4-digit SIC codes, I separate the 88 firms into 16 industries. Banks, Retails, 
Utilities, Refining and Transportation are the top 5 industries that have the most comment 
letters written to SEC. On the three heatedly debated dimensions, Banks expressed the 
most favorable opinions—highly in favor of IFRS comparability, quality and the 
potential capital market effects. Firms from other industries are less diverging. Please 
refer to Table 2B for detailed statistics. 
[Insert Table 2B] 
Section 5: Further Analysis on U.S. Firms which responded to IFRS 
 
Firstly, the six dimensions of opinions divergence are specified in Table 3A. The 
association between comparability and quality is high, which indicates that a commenter 
is likely to give same opinions along these two dimensions. Also, the association between 
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Quality and Effect is relatively high (0.44). All other dimensions have either non-
significant association or significant but low associations. This gives some evidence to 
the orthogonality of the proposed dimensions, which happened to coincide with Hail et al 
(2009) discussions. 
 
[Insert Table 3A Here] 
 
As evidenced in Table 3B, many of my hypothesized variables are significantly 
correlated with one another. Thus, I adopt a logistic regression analysis to assess the 
association of each of the variables, after controlling for other variables I examine.  
 
[Insert Table 3B Here] 
 
Table 4 uses a logit model and a rare event logit model to run the regressions. King and 
Zeng (2000) provide the rationale for using rare event logit model. They study the 
specific logit model that fits “rare events data, binary dependent variables with dozens to 
thousands of times fewer ones (events, such as wars, vetoes, cases of political activism, 
or epidemiological infections)”. Since the responding firm group is small, compared with 
the total sample, it is appropriate to use relogit model in the regressions.  
 
The regression results indicate that firms with longer firm age, more segments, more 
analysts covering, larger size are more likely to respond to SEC regarding its IFRS 
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adoption proposal. Profitability is negatively correlated with responding likelihood in 
Column 3 and 4. Pseudo R-square indicates that the model fits the data at more than 30% 
significance level. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
As shown in Table 5A and Table 5B, among the six dimensions, G-Index varies only for 
Comparability, Quality and Effect dimensions, which are exactly the three heatedly 
debated topics, as previously shown in the descriptive statistics. Two-tailed t-test 
indicates that firms with less misreporting incentives tend to favor IFRS more than those 
with relatively more misreporting incentives. For Comparability dimension, the 
difference is 1.82, which is highly significant. For Effect dimension, the difference is 1.2 
at 5% significance level. The only marginally significant dimension is Quality, which is 
at 10% level. Wilcoxon test verifies the results of Comparability and Effect, while 
Quality is no longer significant. Table 5B gives logit regression results for these three 
dimensions. After controlling for size, profitability and industry, G-Index is still 
negatively correlated with firms’ likelihood of expressing positive opinions.  
 







Section 6: Robustness Check 
 
To further provide robustness to my previous findings, I include a test to see whether 
firms’ responding to SEC comment requests following a systematic pattern. To rule out 
this possibility, I first checked the names of correspondents of each comment letter to see 
whether the same correspondent’s name appeared in other comment letters written to 
SEC. I did not find the same person in charge repeatedly reacting to SEC comment letters 
in 2008 and 2007 cross-sectionally, which rules out the behavior pattern of a specific 
correspondent’s individual taste. Refer to Appendix I for commenter names. Secondly, I 
include the frequency of firms’ comment letters writing to SEC in 2008 in the logit 
regression to explore whether firms have a consistent pattern in responding to SEC 
comment letter requests. On average, I did not find a statistically significant relation 
between frequency of comment letters and the likelihood of responding to SEC 
Roadmap. This further provides support to previous findings that firms react to IFRS 
Roadmap with rational expectations of benefits and costs instead of a behavioral habit. 
The results are not reported here due to insignificant loadings, but are subject to request. 
 
Section 7: Conclusion 
To conclude, this paper provides early empirical evidence regarding the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the United States. A lobbying 
approach is implemented to study a sample of 251 comments letters in response to the 
most up-to-date IFRS document – Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements 
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, 
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which was publicly announced by Security and Exchange Committee (SEC) for 
comments due on April 30th 2009. By sorting the diverging opinions into six dimensions, 
I find that opinion diverges in three major dimensions, namely IFRS comparability, IFRS 
quality and market economic and litigation consequences. My results show that firm with 
more experience, more segments, more information demand, larger size, poorer 
profitability tend to be more active in lobbying to SEC regarding their opposing or 
supporting IFRS adoption opinions, after controlling their industries; moreover, this 
behavior pattern cannot be explained by firms’ idiosyncratic tastes in reacting to SEC 
comment letters request. Among all firms with adequate data, I find that U.S. firms with 
relatively less shareholder protections, as captured by G-Index, incline to express 
opposing opinions regarding the previous three heatedly debated dimensions. This result 
supplements accounting regulation research in that it shows IFRS is welcomed in the 
United States by firms with less misreporting incentives and that IFRS is not a mere 
signaling device for U.S. firms. A direct research topic linking to this paper is to study 
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Abbott 1 1 1 3 0 1 4/20/2009 20 0
Air Products and Chemicals Inc. 0 1 0 1 0 1 4/3/2009 4 0
Alcoa Inc. 0 1 1 1 1 1 4/15/2009 9 0
Allianz SE 1 1 1 1 1 1 4/16/2009 16 0
AmerisourceBergen Corporation 0 1 1 1 0 0 4/14/2009 4 0
AT&T Inc 0 1 3 3 0 1 4/20/2009 3 0
Best Buy Co., Inc 0 1 0 3 0 0 4/20/2009 2 0
BP p.l.c. 1 1 1 1 1 1 4/15/2009 2 1
Cabot corp 1 1 1 3 0 1 4/17/2009 2 0
Central European Media Enterprises. Ltd 3 1 1 3 1 1 4/17/2009 4 0
Chevron 0 3 3 1 0 1 4/16/2009 5 1
CIGNA Corp 1 1 0 1 0 0 4/20/2009 5 0
Cisco Systems, Inc. 0 1 1 1 0 1 4/20/2009 11 0
citigroup 0 1 1 0 0 1 4/20/2009 4 1
CMS Energy Corp. 0 0 0 1 0 0 4/20/2009 6 0
Community Health Systems, Inc. 0 0 0 3 0 0 4/9/2009 4 0
CSX Corp 0 1 3 1 0 0 4/20/2009 2 0
Cymer Inc. 0 1 1 1 0 1 4/1/2009 3 0
Darden Restaurants, Inc. 0 1 0 0 0 0 4/17/2009 4 0
DB 0 1 1 1 1 1 4/20/2009 24 1
dell 0 1 1 1 0 1 2/20/2009 20 0
Dominion Resources, Inc. 0 0 0 1 0 0 4/20/2009 3 0
Dupont 1 1 1 1 0 1 4/8/2009 5 0
Ebay Inc. 3 1 1 0 0 1 4/20/2009 7 0
Enbridge. Inc. 0 1 1 1 0 1 4/20/2009 3 0
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0 1 0 1 0 1 2/17/2009 22 0
Fannie Mae 0 1 1 0 0 1 4/20/2009 2 0
First Commonwealth 0 1 0 1 0 3 4/20/2009 3 0
First Data 1 1 1 1 0 1 4/20/2009 6 0
First Energy 0 1 1 1 0 0 4/17/2009 6 0
FPL Group Inc. 0 3 3 1 0 3 4/20/2009 6 0
General Electric Company 1 1 1 0 0 0 4/21/2009 5 0
General Mills Inc. 0 1 1 1 0 0 4/20/2009 9 0
Hertz Corporation 0 1 1 1 0 0 2/3/2009 3 0
Hess Corp 0 0 0 1 0 0 4/6/2009 3 0
Honeywell International 0 0 0 1 0 0 3/30/2009 5 0
Hot Topic Inc. 0 1 0 3 0 1 1/21/2009 2 0
HSBC North America Holding Inc 0 1 1 3 0 1 4/20/2009 6 1
Huron Consulting Group 1 1 1 0 0 0 4/21/2009 19 0
IBM 1 1 1 1 1 1 2/19/2009 4 0
ING Insurance Americas 1 1 1 1 1 1 4/15/2009 5 1
Intel Corporation 0 1 1 1 1 1 3/27/2009 5 1
JC Penny Company, Inc. 0 1 1 1 0 1 4/17/2009 4 0
KeyCorp 0 1 0 1 0 1 4/15/2009 4 0
Kohl's Corporation 0 3 3 1 0 0 2/28/2009 1 0
Liberty Global 0 0 0 1 0 0 4/16/2009 6 0
Lilly Eli and Company 0 1 0 3 0 0 4/20/2009 4 1
Lubrizol Corporation 0 1 0 1 0 0 4/14/2009 6 0
Manulife Financial 1 1 1 1 1 1 4/20/2009 8 0
Marriott International Inc 0 1 3 1 0 0 2/2/2009 7 0
McDonald's Corporation 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/14/2009 4 0
MeadWestvaco Corp 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/16/2009 5 0
Metlife Inc 0 1 1 1 0 1 4/20/2009 11 0
Microsoft Inc 0 0 0 3 0 0 4/20/2009 2 1
Molson Coors Brewing Company 0 1 1 3 0 0 4/20/2009 3 0
Morgan Stanley 3 1 1 1 0 1 4/20/2009 3 1
Northrop Grumman Corp. 0 0 0 1 0 0 4/7/2009 5 0
Pepsico 0 1 1 1 0 1 4/12/2009 4 1
Pfizer Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/20/2009 4 0
Plains Exploration & Profuction Company 0 1 1 3 0 1 4/15/2009 3 0
Plantronics, Inc. 0 1 1 3 0 0 4/1/2009 3 0
Plum Greek Timber Company Inc. 0 0 0 3 0 0 3/24/2009 8 0
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 4/13/2009 14 0
Potlatch Corp 0 0 0 1 0 0 4/20/2009 2 0
PPL Corporation 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/20/2009 22 0
Progress Energy, Inc. 0 1 0 1 0 0 4/20/2009 15 0
Rayonier Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/20/2009 3 0
Raytheon Company 0 1 0 1 0 0 4/20/2009 12 0
Regions Financial Corp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3/30/2009 7 0
Sempra Energy 0 0 0 1 0 1 4/17/2009 6 0
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Appendix II: Conceptual Framework Development 
 
I assume that there are two types of decision makers involved. One is an investment  
 
policy central planner in acquiring country i  seeking investment opportunities globally,  
 
i.e., looking for cross-border M&A projects. The other is the accounting standards setter  
 
in the target country j . At initial stage, the planner selects an optimal level of weighting 
 
 'jw  s.t. 
' 1jw =∑  on each target country j  to optimize the utility of its scarce resource;  
 
given that, at the next stage, the target j 's accounting standards setters are trying to self- 
 
select their own standards' idiosyncratic noise in order to provide the most informational  
 
advantage to the foreign acquirer. In total there are N target countries. I assume costless  
 
and timeless shifts in accounting standards selection. I further assume that there exists 
 
 one-one mapping from the set of accounting standards to the set of standards systemic  
 
noise. Also information about first stage acquirer's weighting decision and each of the  
 
target countries' accounting standards setters' objective function is common knowledge.  
 
Further assume the information cost as a result of accounting standards systemic noise is  
 
monotonically increasing with the information signal's volatility produced by the target 
 
 countries' accounting system, i.e. without loss of generality, 
 
 
                                                    ( )i ic V s ε= +                                                           (.1) 
 
 
(.)V is the variance of information signal noise produced by a country's accounting 
 
 standard's system; s  is the true set of information signal noise due to uncertainty of  
 




countries; iε  is the systemic idiosyncratic information noise produced by a country's  
 
accounting system. Let [ )2 2 0~ ( , ); ~ (0, ); ( , ) 0; ,i i i is N N COV sα β ε δ ε δ δ= ∈ +∞ . This  
 
further gives  
 
                                                   2 2i ic β δ= +                                                                (.2) 
 
 
The profit function faced by the country planner to invest in the global M&A markets 
 
initially at T=0 is: 
 
                                                    TP W C∏ = −                                                            (.3) 
  
Where [ ]'1 2, ,..., NP p p p= is the vector that represents the constant  net profit from  
 
carrying M&A transactions in N target countries; [ ]'1 2, ,..., NC c c c=  is the vector of  
 
the respective accounting information cost from all target countries;  
 
'' ' '
1 2, ,..., NW w w w =   is the weighting vector optimally chosen by the acquirer. I  
 
propose a simplified objective function of a target country j ’s accounting standards  
 
setting body at T=1, i.e., choose a set of accounting standards which permits certain 
 
 level of systemic information noise to enable the target country to be most  
 
informationally attractive among all potential candidates to the acquirer. Holding  
 
production net profits and information noise from cash flow uncertainty ceteris  
 
paribus across all N target countries, I derive the following objective function for all  
 
target countries’ accounting standards setters:  
 
 
                                           ' ' 2 ' 2 1 2max ( , ,..., )
i





Next I show that the previous setting satisfies four conditions necessary for a  
 
Bertrand competition model to hold:  
 
 
First, there are at least two target countries' accounting standards setters producing  
 
homogeneous accounting information for the acquirer; second, target countries'  
 
accounting standards setters do not cooperate; third, target countries' accounting  
 
standards setters compete by self-selecting a lower information noise level  
 
simultaneously; last, the acquirer buys everything from a target at a lowered  
 
information cost ceteris paribus. If all targets charge the same price, the acquirer  
 
randomly selects among them. 
 
 
Under these conditions satisfying Bertrand competition game, all target countries  
 
accounting standards setters compete to reach Nash equilibrium state by self-selecting  
 





              ' ' 2 ' 2 ' ' 2 ' 20 0 0 1 2( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., )i i i i i i i i Nw p w w w p w wβ δ δ δ δ β δ δ δ δ− − >= − −             (.5) 
 
 
Due to the one-one mapping assumption between accounting standards set and  
 
standards systemic noise set, I conclude that all target countries will harmonize their  
 
accounting standards at the Nash equilibrium stage. Therefore, when accounting  
 
standards are harmonized, any deviation from this strategy will be sub-optimal to the 
 



















Figure 3. The IFRS legislative timeline for United States   
 






















































































Table 10: Instrumental Variable Robustness Check
AD Measure I AD MeasureII
lvalue Coef. Std. Err. z P>z lvalue Coef.   Std. Err. z    P>z
PostDiff1 -1.448 2.042 -0.710 0.478 PostDiff2 -1.794 1.204 -1.740 0.083
lpop_o 0.416 0.023 18.290 0.000 lpop_o 0.424 0.030 14.270 0.000
lpop_d 0.391 0.034 11.420 0.000 lpop_d 0.397 0.031 12.640 0.000
lcap_o 0.607 0.084 7.230 0.000 lcap_o 0.547 0.088 6.240 0.000
lcap_d 0.507 0.100 5.090 0.000 lcap_d 0.446 0.100 4.460 0.000
ldistw -0.170 0.042 -4.040 0.000 ldistw -0.188 0.032 -5.810 0.000
contig 0.329 0.144 2.290 0.022 contig 0.341 0.145 2.350 0.019
comlang_off 0.170 0.111 1.530 0.126 comlang_off 0.073 0.104 0.700 0.485
comlang_ethno -0.137 0.157 -0.870 0.384 comlang_ethno 0.033 0.102 0.330 0.744
comcol 0.433 0.182 2.380 0.018 comcol 0.404 0.172 2.340 0.019
comleg 0.302 0.126 2.400 0.016 comleg -0.129 0.324 -0.400 0.691
col45 -1.392 0.184 -7.570 0.000 col45 -1.373 0.167 -8.240 0.000
colony 0.561 0.105 5.330 0.000 colony 0.499 0.134 3.730 0.000
bothgatt -0.657 0.700 -0.940 0.348 bothgatt -0.591 0.444 -1.330 0.183
rta 0.128 0.200 0.640 0.522 rta 0.047 0.175 0.270 0.787
comcur -0.167 0.095 -1.750 0.080 comcur -0.169 0.096 -1.750 0.079
acp_to_eu 0.050 0.355 0.140 0.887 acp_to_eu 0.032 0.251 0.130 0.900
eu_to_acp 0.452 0.282 1.610 0.108 eu_to_acp 0.473 0.249 1.900 0.057  
Dependent variable is the change of total aggregated value (Ln VALUE) of all deals from SDC Database one year before and after 2005. CEPII dataset is used for all the control 
variables for pairs of countries 2000 to 2006. I self develop the dataset to cover 2007 to 2009 and include Taiwan as an additional country. Two accounting standards disparity 
measures are calculated. In pre mandatory IFRS adoption period, PREDIFF1(2) are used. In post mandatory IFRS adoption period, POSTDIFF1(2) are used. The monadic effects 
are controlled by taking log of both countries’ GDP per capita (LCAP_O;LCAP_D) and population (LPOP_O; LPOP_D) as determinants of bilateral trade patterns in the 
regressions. For dyadic control variables, time-fixed dyadic variables are controlled by including log of weighted-disparity (LDISTW) and dummies coded 1 if both countries have 
common  contiguity (CONTIGUITY), common official language (COMLANG_OFF), common ethnos (COMLANG_ETHNO), common colonizer post 1945 (COLONIZER) and 
common legal origin (COMLEG); are pairs in colonial relationship post 1945 (COL45); ever have been in colonial relationship (COLONY). For time-varying dyadic control 
variables, dummies  are coded 1 if both countries are GATT/WTO members (BOTHGATT); have regional trade agreement in force and common currency (RTA); are from ACP 
countries to EU countries (ACP_EU) and the reverse (EU_ACP).IV instruments are both partner countries’ population difference. The detailed sources and definitions of each 
control variable are included in Table1. Standard errors are clustered by year and corrected for heterogeneity and extreme outliers. All standard errors are reported in parentheses in 
corrected form. * is p<10%; ** is p<5%;*** is p<1%.
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Essay II Tables 
Table 1: Comment Letters Sample Selection Process 




comment letters     251 
Less Non-opinion Letters   (60) 
 Non-public Firms   (10) 
 Non-Investor Group   (24) 
 Investor Group   (8) 
 Individuals   (9) 
 Accountant   (18) 
 Academia    (14) 
 Other    (20) 
Public firms     88  
Less missing data firms    (16) 
Final responding firms    72  
 
All comment letters were separated into eight categories, namely, public firms, non-public firms, non-investor group, 
investor group, individuals, accountants, academia and other. Public firms represent the group of publicly trading firms; 
non-public firms represent the group of private firms; investor group represents business association, industry 
organization and investment association; non-investor group represent any group that is not of a business orientation; 
individuals represent any working professionals; accountants represent accounting firms and its staff; academia 
represents accounting professors from universities; other represents any government organization that does not fall into 
the previous seven categories. After deleting 60 non-opinion letters, 10 non-public firm letters, 24 non-investor group 
letters, 8 investor group letters, 9 individual letters, 18 accountants letters, 14 academia letters, 20 other letters and 




   Table 2A: Summary of Public Opinion Divergence regarding SEC Roadmap by Commentors 
 
  




Early Adoption & 
Compatibility 




Economic & Litigation 
Effects 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Commentors Freq. Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other 
Public Firms 88 71 14 3 34 43 11 73 15 0 20 63 5 18 54 16 42 44 2 
(% in Total)  81% 16% 3% 39% 49% 13% 83% 17% 0% 23% 72% 6% 20% 61% 18% 48% 50% 2% 
Non-public Firms 10 5 1 4 3 7 0 9 1 0 2 8 0 1 5 4 4 4 2 
(% in Total)  50% 10% 40% 30% 70% 0% 90% 10% 0% 20% 80% 0% 10% 50% 40% 40% 40% 20% 
Non-Investor 
Group 24 12 5 7 6 12 6 19 3 2 6 16 2 7 13 4 7 12 5 
(% in Total)  50% 21% 29% 25% 50% 25% 79% 13% 8% 25% 67% 8% 29% 54% 17% 29% 50% 21% 
Investor Group 8 6 0 2 5 3 0 7 0 1 5 3 0 4 3 1 6 1 1 
(% in Total)  75% 0% 25% 63% 38% 0% 88% 0% 13% 63% 38% 0% 50% 38% 13% 75% 13% 13% 
Individuals 9 5 0 4 5 2 2 7 1 1 4 2 3 3 0 6 5 3 1 
(% in Total)  56% 0% 44% 56% 22% 22% 78% 11% 11% 44% 22% 33% 33% 0% 67% 56% 33% 11% 
Accountant 18 13 2 3 3 10 5 8 8 2 3 11 4 6 8 4 7 10 1 
(% in Total)  72% 11% 17% 17% 56% 28% 44% 44% 11% 17% 61% 22% 33% 44% 22% 39% 56% 6% 
Academia 14 10 1 3 9 2 3 11 2 1 9 3 2 9 3 2 6 4 4 
(% in Total)  71% 7% 21% 64% 14% 21% 79% 14% 7% 64% 21% 14% 64% 21% 14% 43% 29% 29% 
Other 20 11 3 6 5 10 5 11 7 2 4 14 2 9 7 4 5 10 5 
(% in Total)  55% 15% 30% 25% 50% 25% 55% 35% 10% 20% 70% 10% 45% 35% 20% 25% 50% 25% 
                    
Total  191 133 26 32 70 89 32 145 37 9 53 120 18 57 93 41 82 88 21 
(% in Total)  70% 14% 17% 37% 47% 17% 76% 19% 5% 28% 63% 9% 30% 49% 21% 43% 46% 11% 
In terms of “Comparability”, I read the content of the comment letter and coded 1 if that particular commenter expressed words containing “comparable”, “comparability” with a 
supporting point of view of IFRS’ improvements on financial reporting comparability, using rational logical deduction; coded 0 if the view is opposing and 3 otherwise. In terms of 
“Quality”, the letters were read and coded 1 if the word “quality” was mentioned in the letter, with a clear expressions of supporting that IFRS is a high quality accounting standard, such 
as “agree it is of high quality” or “support the high quality standards” etc; it was coded 0, if the opinion was opposing and 3 otherwise. For “Effect”, the content covered the lines in the 
comment letters, which explicitly discussed the potential capital market economic benefits/costs, auditor responsibility and litigation risk, other than implementation cost that IFRS might 
bring to the commenter. Similar favorable opinions covering this range were coded 1; any opposing opinion was coded 0 and 3 otherwise. For “Scheme”, it stands for the adoption 
proposal raised by SEC Roadmap. An opinion was coded 1 if the commenter responded in favor of the current adoption plan; if the commenter was against the plan, it was coded 0; it was 
coded 3 otherwise. For “FASB”, an opinion was coded 1 if the commenter supported the coordination between FASB and IASB and the letter was coded 0, if the commenter expressed 
unfavorable opinion towards FASB and IASB convergence projects; 3 if no opinion expressed or other. “Cost” was coded 1 if a firm explicitly expressed opinions pointing to the fact that 
the benefit of implementing IFRS overweighs the cost; coded 0 if a firm believed that the cost of implementation is higher than the benefit; 3 otherwise. 
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Table 2B: Summary of Public Opinion Divergence regarding SEC Roadmap by Industry 
  




Early Adoption & 
Compatibility 




Economic & Litigation 
Effects 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Industry  Freq. Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other Cons Pros Other 
Food 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 
Textiles 5 5 0 0 4 0 1 5 0 0 4 1 0 2 2 1 4 1 0 
Drugs 4 3 1 0 2 2 0 3 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 
Chemicals 4 1 3 0 1 3 0 3 1 0 0 4 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 
Refining 6 5 1 0 3 2 1 5 1 0 1 4 1 0 5 1 2 4 0 
Rubber 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Industrial 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Electrical 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Misc. Equip. 5 5 0 0 4 1 0 5 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 0 4 1 0 
Computers 7 4 2 1 1 6 0 5 2 0 1 6 0 1 5 1 1 6 0 
Transportation 6 5 0 1 1 2 3 4 2 0 1 5 0 0 4 2 3 3 0 
Utilities 10 9 1 0 5 3 2 10 0 0 4 4 2 2 7 1 6 3 1 
Retail 11 11 0 0 5 4 2 11 0 0 2 8 1 4 5 2 7 4 0 
Banks 17 12 4 1 6 11 0 10 7 0 1 16 0 5 10 2 3 13 1 
Services 5 4 1 0 2 2 1 5 0 0 2 3 0 1 3 1 5 0 0 
Total 88 71 14 3 34 43 11 73 15 0 20 63 5 18 54 16 42 44 2 
(% in Total)  81% 16% 3% 39% 49% 13% 83% 17% 0% 23% 72% 6% 20% 61% 18% 48% 50% 2% 
 
In terms of “Comparability”, I read the content of the comment letter and coded 1 if that particular commenter expressed words containing “comparable”, “comparability” with a supporting 
point of view of IFRS’ improvements on financial reporting comparability, using rational logical deduction; coded 0 if the view is opposing and 3 otherwise. In terms of “Quality”, the letters 
were read and coded 1 if the word “quality” was mentioned in the letter, with a clear expressions of supporting that IFRS is a high quality accounting standard, such as “agree it is of high 
quality” or “support the high quality standards” etc; it was coded 0, if the opinion was opposing and 3 otherwise. For “Effect”, the content covered the lines in the comment letters, which 
explicitly discussed the potential capital market economic benefits/costs, auditor responsibility and litigation risk, other than implementation cost that IFRS might bring to the commenter. 
Similar favorable opinions covering this range were coded 1; any opposing opinion was coded 0 and 3 otherwise. For “Scheme”, it stands for the adoption proposal raised by SEC Roadmap. 
An opinion was coded 1 if the commenter responded in favor of the current adoption plan; if the commenter was against the plan, it was coded 0; it was coded 3 otherwise. For “FASB”, an 
opinion was coded 1 if the commenter supported the coordination between FASB and IASB and the letter was coded 0, if the commenter expressed unfavorable opinion towards FASB and 
IASB convergence projects; 3 if no opinion expressed or other. “Cost” was coded 1 if a firm explicitly expressed opinions pointing to the fact that the benefit of implementing IFRS 




Table 3A: Correlation Matrix for Variables in Essay I 
 
 Cost Quality Compare FASB Scheme Effect 
Cost 1.00 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.24 0.20 
  (0.512) (0.702) (0.952) (0.022) (0.059) 
Quality 0.18 1.00 0.71 0.06 0.08 0.35 
 (0.089)  (0.000) (0.551) (0.473) (0.001) 
Compare 0.20 0.71 1.00 0.02 0.10 0.25 
 (0.066) (0.000)  (0.821) (0.360) (0.017) 
FASB -0.03 0.10 0.04 1.00 0.02 0.02 
 (0.802) (0.351) (0.689)  (0.857) (0.852) 
Scheme 0.31 0.17 0.21 0.07 1.00 0.27 
 (0.003) (0.114) (0.048) (0.534)  (0.012) 
Effect 0.28 0.44 0.37 0.07 0.35 1.00 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.489) (0.001)  
 
P-values are in prances. Upper triangular matrix for results of Pearson correlation; lower triangular  
matrix for results of Spearman correlation.  
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Table 3B: Correlation Matrix for Total Sample in Essay I 
           
 Respond Firm Age Audit Fee Segment Foreign Bkv Mktcap ROA CFO Analyst 
Respond 1.00 0.19 -0.02 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.04 -0.06 
  (0.000) (0.279) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) 
Firm Age 0.14 1.00 -0.08 0.31 0.17 0.39 0.43 0.18 0.15 -0.23 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Audit Fee -0.19 -0.32 1.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.37 -0.20 -0.35 -0.36 0.70 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segment 0.10 0.27 -0.07 1.00 0.40 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.19 -0.15 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.41 1.00 0.22 0.27 0.12 0.16 -0.11 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.646) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bookvalue 0.20 0.40 -0.80 0.34 0.23 1.00 0.81 0.50 0.48 -0.58 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Marketcap 0.20 0.38 -0.69 0.37 0.26 0.88 1.00 0.41 0.38 -0.36 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.06 0.17 -0.22 0.22 0.16 0.36 0.47 1.00 0.76 -0.51 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
CFO 0.05 0.15 -0.14 0.25 0.17 0.32 0.41 0.64 1.00 -0.53 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Analyst -0.17 -0.36 0.87 -0.10 -0.04 -0.68 -0.52 -0.14 -0.04 1.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012)  
 
P-values are reported in prances. Upper triangular matrix for results of Pearson correlation; lower triangular matrix for results of Spearman 
correlation. For each firm, Bookvalue and Marketcap are the log of average book and market capitalization of fiscal year 2008 and 2007. To measure 
experience, I count firm years available in COMPUSTAT database for each firm to represent firm age (Firm Age), assuming that firms with older 
age have better experience in financial reporting and more matured accounting information systems. Audit fees scaled by average asset (Auditor Fee / 
A) is used to capture the average effects that auditors play in a firm. Segments is calculated by summing up all business segments of a particular firm. 
Foreign Currency is a dummy variable which is denoted 1 when a firm has foreign currency translation and 0 otherwise. I measure the specific 
information demand of a firm by using analysts following numbers in 2008 scaled by average total asset. This is denoted Analyst. Return on assets 
(ROA) as calculated by averaging annual returns over assets of the current and prior period year. Another metric, CFO/A, is calculated by dividing 







Table 4: Logit Regressions for IFRS Responding Firms Characteristics 
       
   Predicted Logit Estimate Relogit Estimate Logit Estimate 
Relogit 
Estimate Logit Estimate 
Relogit 
Estimate 
   Sign (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          
Firm Age   + 0.019** 0.018** 0.017** 0.016* 0.016* 0.016* 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Auditor Fee / A  - -0.031 0.001 -0.055 -0.025 -0.046 -0.018 
    (0.042) (0.018) (0.049) (0.022) (0.047) (0.020) 
Foreign Currency  - -0.235 -0.226 -0.301 -0.286 -0.311 -0.292 
    (0.318) (0.334) (0.323) (0.343) (0.323) (0.340) 
Segments   + 0.068** 0.065** 0.073** 0.070** 0.067** 0.064** 
    (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Analyst   + 55.209*** 53.271*** 29.93 30.450* 46.272** 46.286*** 
    (20.587) (14.136) (22.761) (18.263) (22.517) (16.861) 
Bookvalue   + 8.643*** 8.532***   4.225** 4.107** 
    (1.067) (1.086)   -2.002 -1.885 
Marketcap  +   0.982*** 0.967*** 0.562** 0.553*** 
      (0.116) (0.118) (0.226) (0.212) 
ROA   -/+ -0.167 -0.335   -0.187 -0.477 
    (1.376) (1.114)   (1.752) (1.383) 
CFO/A   -/+   -3.916** -3.820*** -2.827 -2.563 
      (1.638) (1.422) (2.278) (2.341) 
Industry    yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of Responding Firms  72 72 72 72 72 72 
Number of Total Sample  3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 
Likelihood Ratio   229.36 n/a 230.97 n/a 235.99 n/a 
 
For each firm, Bookvalue and Marketcap are the log of average book and market capitalization of fiscal year 2008 and 2007. To measure experience, I count firm 
years available in COMPUSTAT database for each firm to represent firm age (Firm Age), assuming that firms with older age have better experience in financial 
reporting and more matured accounting information systems. Audit fees scaled by average asset (Auditor Fee / A) is used to capture the average effects that auditors 
play in a firm. Segments is calculated by summing up all business segments of a particular firm. Foreign Currency is a dummy variable which is denoted 1 when a 
firm has foreign currency translation and 0 otherwise. I measure the specific information demand of a firm by using analysts following numbers in 2008 scaled by 
average total asset. This is denoted Analyst. Return on assets (ROA) as calculated by averaging annual returns over assets of the current and prior period year. 
Another metric, CFO/A, is calculated by dividing cash flows from operations with average total assets of the current and prior period year. Logit and rare event logit 





Table 5A: Opinion Divergence with Different Reporting Incentives: G-Index Proxy  
           
t-test                      
(p-value for 
Ha>0)   
Wilcoxon 
Test        
(p-value 
for Ha>0)   
 Group Obs Mean S.E. Diff. T Pr(T>t) z Prob(Z>z) 
          
Comparability 0 33 9.848 0.440 1.817 2.888 0.002 2.708 0.004 
 1 32 8.031 0.450      
Quality 0 19 9.737 0.566 0.948 1.335 0.047 1.307 0.096 
 1 52 8.788 0.376      
Effect 0 40 9.575 0.389 1.193 2.006 0.012 1.824 0.034 
 1 34 8.382 0.455      
Scheme 0 68 9.015 0.315 -0.485 -0.499 0.345 -0.571 0.284 
 1 8 9.500 0.945      
FASB 0 16 8.938 0.559 -0.193 -0.248 0.299 -0.251 0.401 
 1 46 9.130 0.415      
Cost 0 67 9.164 0.303 0.593 0.569 0.143 0.855 0.196 
 1 7 8.571 1.462      
 1 7 8.571 1.462      
 
Table 5B: Logit Regression for Responding Firms with Diversified Opinions 
            
           Sign  Comparability Quality Effect 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
G-Index  -  -0.282*** -0.219* -0.381** -0.137 -0.200 -0.196 -0.186* -0.202* -0.322** 
    (0.107) (0.112) (0.158) (0.104) (0.127) (0.180) (0.096) (0.110) (0.136) 
Controls     yes   Yes   yes  
Industry      yes   yes   yes 
Likelihood Ratio   7.95 8.17 18.73 1.8 6.25 18.52 4.00 5.11 23.04 
Pseudo R^2    0.088 0.09 0.246 0.022 0.082 0.242 0.039 0.057 0.253 
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